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Abstract 
How much can poverty be reduced through carbon
tax revenue? This study analyses specific pro-
grammes, with carbon taxes generating revenues
and equivalent spending on programmes to reduce
energy poverty. The twin challenges of develop-
ment and climate change could be addressed in this
way in South Africa. A simple spreadsheet model
was used to estimate revenue available from a car-
bon tax, given different tax rates and emission pro-
jections. Four programmes to reduce energy pover-
ty were quantified: electrification, extended free
basic energy, scaling-up sustainable housing, and
subsidising rooftop solar for poor households.
Matching carbon revenue with equivalent expendi-
ture, the study found that applying all carbon rev-
enue to a single programme could fund the national
budget for electrification. Hundreds of thousands,
and up to tens of millions, of households could
receive free energy in the form of 5 kg of liquefied
petroleum gas every month, as well as better houses
that are warmer in winter and with fewer health
impacts from indoor air pollution. Carbon revenues
could fund at least a few hundred thousand
improved homes, or subsidies for at least 100 000
rooftop solar systems per year to poor households.
Institutional and other constraints would have to be
addressed. Carbon revenue could fully fund all four
programmes combined into an integrated strategy,
in three of the four scenarios. The results suggested
that full funding could be available from 2019 or
from 2025, dependent on carbon tax revenue sce-
nario. Energy poverty can be reduced by expendi-
ture of carbon tax revenues.
Keywords: carbon prices, revenue scenarios, pover-
ty eradication, climate change mitigation, socio-eco-
nomic benefits 
Highlights: 
• Energy poverty can be reduced by expenditure
using carbon tax revenues.
• Paper estimates revenues across a range of car-
bon tax rates.
• Revenues can fund large-scale programmes to
reduce energy poverty: electrification, LPG,
sustainable housing, rooftop solar. 
• Integrated energy poverty strategy can be fund-
ed in three of four carbon revenue scenarios.
• Tax revenue could be available from 2019 to
2025.
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1. Introduction 
How much can poverty be reduced through carbon
tax revenue? This study examines this question in
the context of South Africa, yet it is salient for many
other countries. The challenge is to address both
development and climate change. More than two
decades ago, the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) recog-
nised that ‘economic and social development and
poverty eradication are the first and overriding pri-
orities of the developing country Parties’ [1]. More
recently, the climate community considered goals of
net zero emissions as a long-term goal by 2050
[2,3], which is included by reference to a balance of
sources and sinks in Article 4.1 of the Paris
Agreement [4]. Zero poverty is needed as much as
zero emissions, to broaden participation. The first
sustainable development goal (SDG) in the post-
2015 development agenda is to ‘end poverty in all
its forms everywhere’ [5]. The general argument for
a development-and-climate approach remains
highly relevant and needs to be implemented in
specific contexts. 
In South Africa, the issue can be framed in rela-
tion to an intensifying debate about introducing a
carbon tax. Having long been studied [6-8], its
implementation needs to take into account the top
priorities identified in the National Development
Plan (NDP), to reduce poverty and inequality [9].
Chapter 5 of the NDP seeks to ensure the sustain-
ability of development, requiring ‘an equitable tran-
sition to a low-carbon economy’ [9], and in this
context supports pricing of carbon. National
Treasury’s carbon tax policy design accepted that
poverty-reduction mechanisms should be funded
not by ‘ring-fencing’ or ‘hard ear-marking’, but with
on-budget allocations to poverty programmes [10].
The current study builds on previous analysis
(Section 2) in asking how much revenues generated
by a carbon tax can help to alleviate poverty. The
study proceeds as follows: Section 2 locates the pre-
sent analysis in the broader framing of development
and climate, with relevant literature review. Section
3 develops carbon tax revenue scenarios associated
with different tax rates and emission projections.
Four energy poverty reduction programmes are
detailed in Section 4, referencing the data used and
stating own assumptions made for the analysis. The
next section matches carbon tax revenue and
expenditure, assuming the equivalent revenue is
applied to each programme singly, and all four
combined into an overall strategy. The limitations of
the analysis and idea for future work are outlined in
Section 6, followed by conclusions. 
2. Framing the development and climate
challenge
The specific question of how much poverty reduc-
tion can be funded by revenues from carbon-pricing
mechanisms is located in a broader framework and
literature. The framing of a development and cli-
mate challenge was considered in the literature over
the last decade [11-22]. Over several reports from
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), climate change was increasingly assessed
as a development issue [22–24]. More recent litera-
ture suggests that a new social contract may be
needed for low-carbon development, requiring the
rich to pay for mitigation, use less, and assist the
poor; lifting the poor out of poverty; and changing
the aspirations of the middle class [11]. The SDGs
can be read as including elements of such a con-
tract, with ending poverty as the first goal, as well as
reducing inequality (Goal 10) and ensuring sustain-
able consumption and production patterns (Goal
12) [25]. 
Within this broader framing, earlier literature has
examined what a development-climate approach
might mean in terms of policy and policy instru-
ments. Earlier studies made the case that instru-
ments such as sustainable development policies and
measures (SD-PAMs) would better frame action in
developing countries [26-31]. The concept of SD-
PAMs was mooted in a dialogue under the UNFC-
CC [30] and, in the process of negotiations,
became nationally appropriate mitigation action
(NAMAs). Mitigation actions include carbon taxes,
whether these are deemed nationally appropriate,
depends on each context. The Bali Action Plan
framed ‘nationally appropriate mitigation actions by
developing country Parties in the context of sustain-
able development’ [32] (emphasis added) in its
paragraph 1(b)(ii). 
Another body of literature addresses the multiple
dimensions of poverty. What does it means to
reduce poverty? Poverty is not simply a lack of
income, but has much broader and multiple dimen-
sions. For example, the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) developed a
multidimensional poverty index, building on the
work of Amartya Sen [33]. The UNDP adds to
money metrics other measures of deprivation,
including in health and education. Statistics South
Africa also adopted a multi-dimensional poverty
index [34]. It is, however, beyond the scope of this
study to explore all the dimensions of poverty in
depth, except to recognise that reducing energy
poverty must address multiple dimensions. Poverty
is treated as a distinct dimension from mitigation in
this study, with poverty reduction programmes not
limited to those that also reduce emissions. Some of
the literature on carbon pricing in SA would treat
poverty more generally as a contextual issue [35-
39]. Other studies focus on the economic implica-
tions of a carbon tax conceptually [40], while Alton
et al quantify socio-economic impacts using an
economy-wide model [41]. One conference paper
more directly examined the potential of project-
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based carbon revenues for poverty alleviation, but
argued that these revenues ‘don’t work for typical,
small African poverty alleviation projects with low
greenhouse gas emission reduction potential’, and
that smaller carbon registries would be a better fit
[42]. In this context, the focus of this study is on
using carbon revenues to reduce poverty, and on
understanding how and how much that could be
done. Since much of mitigation in South Africa will
occur in the energy sector, reducing energy poverty
may be an obvious area [43-49]. 
3. Revenue from a carbon tax 
A simple spreadsheet model is used to estimate rev-
enue available from a carbon tax, given different
emission projections (hereafter referred to as carbon
tax revenue scenarios). The spreadsheet is made
available for download as supplementary digital
information.1 
3.1 Carbon tax revenues estimated for the
first year
Details of the carbon tax have evolved and were
included in draft Carbon Tax Bill in 2015 [50]. As
draft legislation, it does not quantify revenues.
Earlier in 2015, the total revenues from a carbon
tax were estimated explicitly in a proposal by
National Treasury to the Partnership for Market
Readiness (PMR): 
Considering that majority of GHG emissions
accounted for in the GHG inventory will form
the carbon tax and the marginal tax rate of
R120 tCO2e, the amount of revenue collected
from carbon tax is likely to be between R7.3
and R29.0 billion for the 2015/16 fiscal year,
with the most likely amount of revenue collect-
ed being around R18 billion.[51] 
The PMR proposal envisaged a maximum exemp-
tion from the ZAR 120 headline tax rate of 90%, as
in the earlier policy paper [10]. The draft Carbon
Tax Bill [50] allowed further exemptions (see dis-
cussion on tax rate below), leading to a 95% total
exemption, which would lead to lower revenues.
Treasury’s estimation of revenues took as its tax
base emissions of 545 Mt CO2-eq from the National
GHG inventory [52] and extrapolated that, in the
fiscal year 2016/17, taxable emissions would reach
610 Mt CO2-eq [51]. 
To put the total carbon tax revenues above into
perspective, a comparison with total tax revenue
can be made. In 2015/16, total revenue was ZAR
1 076 billion [53]. Since 2010/11, revenue has
increased by 10% annually on average, so that, by
linear extrapolation, total revenues would be ZAR
1 182 billion in 2016/17. The share of carbon tax
revenues ranges between 0.6 and 2.5% of total tax
revenue, comparing the estimates in the previous
paragraph with the total. The middle estimate of
ZAR 18 billion [51] is calculated to be 1.5% of total
revenue of ZAR 1.18 trillion. This study follows the
National Treasury’s assumption that the tax is
applied to all emissions in the inventory, rather than
alternatives such as taxing emissions above a com-
pany-level or facility-level carbon budget, since the
latter are foreseen in policy but not yet enforced.
The nominal tax rate of ZAR 120 is, however, not
applied, leaving only the effective rates after
exemptions, as elaborated in the next section.
3.2 Developing scenarios of carbon tax
revenue
The type of scenarios explored in this study uses a
two-by-three box approach, as distinct from mod-
elled scenarios or projections. In environmental sce-
nario development, scenario builders consider driv-
ing forces, major characteristics, logical storylines or
policy paths [54]. This can be illustrated as in Figure
1.
Figure 1: Steps in defining different scenarios
for analysis [55]. 
The driving forces for scenarios of how carbon
tax revenue may change over time are the tax rate
and the quantity of emissions taxed. Since a carbon
tax is a pure price mechanism, the key uncertainty
is the level of the tax rate. The tons of emissions
taxed is taken to depend on the amount of mitiga-
tion that is taking place without the tax, i.e., a sce-
nario independent of the tax. A connection could
be derived, in that firms will bear costs of mitiga-
tion, if it were cheaper than paying the tax. The
responsiveness of the economy to a given tax rate
was not part of this study; indeed responsiveness
cannot be studied empirically until the carbon tax is
implemented. This study takes emissions projec-
tions from the MPA study, in which no tax was con-
sidered [56]. 
Scenarios of carbon tax revenues are developed
by assuming tax rates can be high, medium and
low, and emissions high (with existing measures) or
low (with additional measures). Emissions projec-
tions and tax rate level define the dimensions,
resulting in six scenarios, as illustrated in Table 1,
including the six possible scenarios for internal con-
sistency.
The tax rates considered to develop revenue
scenarios in this study draw on the assumptions by
Treasury in its 2013 carbon tax policy paper [10]
and the 2015 draft Carbon Tax Bill [50]. The policy
paper introduced a basic tax-free allowance of
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60%, with further exemptions for process emis-
sions, trade-exposure and off-set, each up to 10%,
and an intensity-related Z-factor of ±5%, with a
maximum exemption capped at 90% [10]. The
draft Carbon Tax Bill also included an additional
allowance for fugitive emissions up to 10% and
treatment of the Z-factor only as a reward, i.e.,
another 5% allowances, with the maximum total
allowances limited to 95% [50]. Furthermore, it
should be noted that the draft Carbon Tax Bill pro-
vides a detailed Schedule 2 for exemptions for var-
ious sectors and sub-sectors. It distinguishes emis-
sions from fossil fuel combustion, industrial process-
es, product use and fugitive emissions with some
direct and indirect emissions; although it neither
explicitly refers to definitions of Scope 1, 2 and 3
emissions as in the GHG Protocol [57] nor men-
tions overtly the tiers used in IPCC guidelines for
inventories [58]. These distinctions are not required
for the current study paper, which refers simply to
three tax rates, providing a range from low to high
effective tax. 
The effective tax rates after 60, 75 and 95%
exemptions are calculated as ZAR 6, ZAR 30 and
ZAR 48 per ton of CO2-equivalent, for the initial
year 2016. In this study, these are referred to as
high, medium and low tax rates. The tax policy is
for financial years, e.g. 2016/7; in this paper these
are taken as calendar years (2017); the three-month
difference is not material to the analysis. The tax
rates are consistent with the explanatory memoran-
dum to the Carbon Tax Bill, stating that ‘the effec-
tive carbon tax rate will vary between ZAR 6 and
ZAR 48 per ton CO2-e’ [50]. 
In the present analysis, the assumption of an
increase in the tax rate of 10% per year is retained
for 2016–2020 [10], and by the consumer price
index (CPI) plus 2% from 2021 onwards [51]. It is
further assumed that CPI remains similar to histori-
cal levels of 6% in future [59]. Under these assump-
tions, tax rates evolve as illustrated in Figure 2. 
Emission projections are taken from the mitiga-
tion potential analysis (MPA), the projections with
existing measures (WEM) and with additional mea-
sures (WAM) [56]. The WEM was taken as a refer-
ence case in the MPA, while WAM assumes mitiga-
tion actions are taken. The MPA explored scenarios
in which different percentages of mitigation poten-
tial where realised. For this study, the full potential
(100% of mitigation options assessed) was consid-
ered, with 75% coverage of sectors [51]. This
allowed exploration of a full range of envelope sce-
narios, as shown in Figure 3, with total emissions for
WEM and WAM scenarios at 75% coverage, over
the period 2016–2030. 
The carbon tax revenue scenarios are calculated
by multiplying the emissions projections and future
tax rates, based on the assumptions above. Figure
4 shows the results for all six scenarios. These sce-
narios go to 2030, beyond the time-frame of the
phases of the carbon tax as envisaged by Treasury’s
draft Carbon Tax Bill. 
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Table 1: Possible scenarios defined by high and
low emission projections and tax rates.
Emissions projection





Note: WEM-Hi, WEM-Med and WEM-Lo = with existing
measures, with high (ZAR 48), medium (ZAR 30) and
low (ZAR 6) tax rates respectively; and WAM-Hi, WAM-
Med and WAM-Lo = with additional measures, for the
same range of tax rates. 
Figure 2: High medium and low tax rates, 2016–2030, where CO2e = CO2-equivalent.
Two of the six possible options in Figure 4 and
Table 1 are excluded from further analysis, remov-
ing those where the storylines are not internally
consistent. The WEM-Hi would be a scenario in
which emissions keep growing, which is not consis-
tent with assuming a higher tax rate (though it is a
separate question whether the tax rate considered
was high enough in ‘higher’ to achieve WAM).
Conversely, a significant decline of emissions at the
lower tax rate is not internally consistent either, so
WAM-Lo is also not considered further. 
Having developed scenarios of carbon revenue
from the initial year and over time, the study now
turns to how revenue might be spent to reduce
energy poverty.
4. Expenditure to reduce (energy) poverty
using different policy instruments 
This section examines possible programmes to
reduce poverty, which could be financed by carbon
revenue. Given that most of national emissions are
from energy supply and use [52,61,62], this study
focused on programmes that could help to ensure
that poor households were at least as well off in
terms of energy access under a carbon tax as with-
out one, and that access was affordable [63]. The
study considered options that have been rolled out
at scale in South Africa already (notably further
electrification), extending a programme (free basic
electricity to other energy), and scaling-up from
project to programme (sustainable housing) and an
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Figure 3: Two emissions projections assuming 100% potential and 75% of emissions covered by
tax, 2016 to 2030, where CO2e = carbon dioxide equivalent; data from [60].
Figure 4: Carbon tax revenues under six scenarios; scenario names as defined in Table 1.
option from international experience not yet been
seen widely in South Africa (rooftop solar home
systems). An integrated strategy combining all four
options (and their respective benefits) was also con-
sidered, but first this study turned to a more detailed
description of each programme and the data and
assumptions informing the spreadsheet modelling
(see also the supplementary information). The
quantified benefits are summarised in Table 2, after
each programme was elaborated. 
4.1 Extend access by grid electrification 
Universal access to modern energy services has
been a key goal of energy policy since 1998 [64].
The Department of Energy (DoE) in collaboration
with Eskom and municipal distributors has imple-
mented an Integrated National Electrification
Programme (INEP) since the 1990s, with many
aspects, including its funding, being evaluated in
both official government documents and academic
literature [65-67]. Funding further electrification
from carbon revenues would free up National
Treasury budget, electrification accounting for 3.2%
of the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
(MTEF) [53] and by far the largest portion of the
DoE budget [68]. Expenditure on electrification is
reported in Table 5.13 of the national budget review
as a revised estimate of ZAR 5 583 million for
2016/17, projecting increased expenditure of ZAR
6 184 billion for 2017/18, ZAR 6 432 billion for
2018/19 and ZAR 7 792 billion by 2019/20 [53].
For this study, these projections are followed, and
from 2020 to 2030 the assumption of an increase
by the consumer price index plus 2% (CPI+2) was
adopted for this and the other programmes, to be
consistent with the assumption of increased carbon
revenue indicated by National Treasury [51]. 
Costs per connection were taken as equivalent
to subsidies, which DoE gives as ZAR 18 500 for
urban and ZAR 19 500 for rural connections for
2016/17 [69], so an average of ZAR 19 000 was
used here. The subsidy is increased annually at
CPI+2 (i.e. 8%) as for all programmes, noting that
National Treasury assumes electrification budgets to
increase at 11.8% for the MTEF period [53]. The
total revenue required is shown in Figure 6, with
more detail in the supplementary information (the
same applies for each of the further programmes in
Sections 4.2 to 4.4). 
Electrification might increase emissions, if the
grid were not changing. The mix of electricity gen-
eration depended heavily on coal, resulting in
‘combined margin emission factor’ for South Africa
of 0.957 tCO2/MWh in 2009/2010 [70]. With
increasing shares of renewable energy, which will
benefit sustainability in social, economic and envi-
ronmental dimensions [71-73], the official electrici-
ty plan projects a 34% decline in CO2 intensity from
2010 to 2030 [74]. Any increase of emissions is,
therefore, likely to be reduced; though the reason
for including the programme is its reduction in ener-
gy poverty. 
4.2 Extend free basic energy from electricity
to liquefied petroleum gas 
Electrification provides physical access to electricity,
whereas this next programme addresses affordabili-
ty of energy. Programmes to make electricity afford-
able have been implemented, notably through free
basic electricity [75], with an amount of typically
50–100 kWh provided free to poor households.
While this is a significant portion of the electricity
consumption of recently connected households
[65], such an amount of electricity is enough only
for lighting, entertainment and some appliances,
but insufficient for many cooking needs and pro-
ductive uses. More recently, consideration was
given to providing free basic energy in other forms
[76]. Providing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) can
extend energy services to cooking and productive
uses, with using LPG safer than cooking on paraffin
stoves and avoiding the health impacts of indoor
use of coal or wood stoves. The CO2 emission fac-
tor for LPG is lower than that for sub-bituminous
coal [58] – whether it is used indoors (also with
health impacts) or for electricity, so that there may
be some mitigation benefits of this poverty-alleviat-
ing measure. This study considered a programme
that would subsidise a 5 kg cylinder per household
per month to one million households (as a ‘unit
programme’, for the purpose of further calcula-
tions). Maximum LPG prices are regulated, ranging
from ZAR 9.54 to ZAR 120.13/kg [77], and an aver-
age value of ZAR 22.3/kg of LPG in 2016 is used,
escalating at CPI+2. 
4.3 Sustainable housing at scale – housing
design, efficiency and solar water-heaters
Providing affordable access to basic electricity and
LPG are two ways of reducing energy poverty, but
the question of houses themselves arises. The third
programme considered in this study focused on sus-
tainable housing. There are concerns about the
quality of buildings, which can be improved at the
same time as promoting energy efficiency and using
renewable energy. The performance of simple ener-
gy-efficiency interventions are better understood,
including ceilings (many houses are built without,
insulation on ceilings, and wall insulation) and solar
water-heaters [78] – referred to in this paper by the
shorthand of ‘sustainable housing’. 
Literature points to the potential for projects to
build sustainable housing [79]. Amongst others, the
Kuyasa project in Khayelitsha Site C, Cape Town,
included passive solar design [80,81]. The chal-
lenge is to scale-up from 2 000 houses to a larger
national programme, a National Sustainable
Settlement Facility, which could channel invest-
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ments required and provide an institutional focus
[82-84]. The Department of Human Settlements
provides support for social housing; the incremental
costs would be to fund the gap for better housing:
‘This funding gap between standard and improved
homes creates an additional financing requirement
to support large-scale, climate-compatible housing
delivery for the low-income sector in South
Africa.’[82] The subsidy would be made available
to households that cannot afford to meet the South
African National Standard (SANS 10400-XA) on
energy usage in buildings themselves, which
requires the inclusion of energy efficiency interven-
tions in all new buildings [85].
Informal housing is not typically energy-efficient.
Although there was a significant housing pro-
gramme in post-apartheid South Africa, with some
3.8 million subsidised housing units constructed,
the housing backlog kept increasing because of
migration. Dobson estimated an increased backlog
on housing units from 1.5 million in 1996 to 2.1
million in 2011 [85], with a slightly lower number of
1.9 million estimated by a more recent report [86]. 
The build rate historically seems to have aver-
aged 190 000 units, taking 3.8 million subsidised
units over 20 years [85], although some sources
suggested 140 000 as an average [86]. Given that
needs might increase at 100 000 houses per year,
removing the backlog requires making the opti-
mistic assumption. Figure 5 shows that a more opti-
mistic build rate than historically seen is required, if
the housing backlog is to be wiped out by 2030. 
At historical build rates, there would still be a
backlog of 740 000 houses in 2030. The optimistic
build rate was assumed in this analysis – to explore
how many sustainable houses the carbon tax rev-
enue could fund. The focus was not on the opera-
tional requirements, but funding, and the incremen-
tal cost per house was a key factor. 
The incremental cost was earlier estimated in a
range of ‘a further R15 000–R20 000 … for
improved energy efficiency measures (including
thermal performance improvements and solar
water heaters)’ per household [82]; more recently a
broader range of ZAR 10 000–20 000 was used
[85]; ZAR 15 000 per household was used for this
analysis.
4.4 Rooftop solar home systems for poor
households
The installation of rooftop solar systems reached
large scale in other countries, for example, 3 GW
installations in Australia by 2013 [87], but is still
limited in South Africa. The photovoltaic (PV) sys-
tems were installed in schools and clinics and con-
cession areas remote from the grid as an alternative
to grid-based electrification [88,89]. The size of sys-
tems for higher-income households may be 5.5
kWp or larger, but as the present analysis focused
on poor households, 1.5 kWp systems were consid-
ered. The average cost appears to range from ZAR
20 000 to ZAR 22 000/kWp installed, including all
the costs of connecting the system to the electricity
grid [90]. Applying the average of ZAR 21 000, a
1.5 kWp system costs ZAR 31 500. A ‘unit pro-
gramme’ of 100 000 households/year would then
require total revenue of ZAR 3.15 billion currently,
escalating at CPI+2. 
4.5 Estimated benefits of poverty reduction
and an integrated programme.
Table 2 summarises the main quantified benefits for
each programme, and the ‘unit programme’
assumed for further calculations. For example, how
many ‘free basic energy’ programmes could carbon
revenue fund – half, or multiples, in the findings in
the following section? It should be noted that, in
Table 2, the reference value for electrification is
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Figure 5: Revenue required to reduce housing backlog at different build rates.
260 000 households, as given by the Energy
Minister for the 2015/16 financial year [91], but
connection rates will depend on resources and insti-
tutional capacity. Similarly for sustainable housing,
the build rates must be understood as a function of
large new revenue sources. There may be higher
build rates, but the historical build rates 
(140 000–190 000 per year) mentioned need to be
considered in interpreting the results. 
Table 2 shows the co-benefits, which are ancil-
lary benefits to the main quantified outcome. It was
noted that several of the programmes assist with
health benefits, as poor households use less paraffin
(common in the Western Cape Province), coal
(Gauteng Province) or wood indoors, and using less
of these fuels indoors reduces health impacts from
air pollutants. Other benefits are specific in that the
sustainable houses, apart from reducing energy
bills, are simply better and more comfortable, as
previously studied [92]. The benefits of electrifica-
tion would depend on how electricity might be used
productively, potentially generating income and
employment, in addition to social benefits (e.g.
lighting for education). 
While the analysis thus far focused on individual
programmes, no single technology or large pro-
gramme was likely to reduce energy poverty on its
own. An integrated strategy combining all four pro-
grammes is considered in the next section. The
study turns to its main findings, regarding how
much poverty can be reduced through carbon rev-
enue. 
5. Findings: To what extent might carbon tax
revenues reduce poverty? 
The expenditure required by each of the four pro-
grammes is shown in Figure 6. It shows that sustain-
able housing requires the largest expenditure initial-
ly, but reduces over time, with the optimistic build
rate reducing the housing backlog, while the other
three programmes require gradually increasing
expenditure, driven by CPI+2. Fuller details calcu-
lations are in the supplementary information file.
The total scale of funding is the line at the top of all
four programmes ‘stacked’ in Figure 6, ranging
approximately between ZAR 30 and ZAR 40 bil-
lion/year, as can be seen in the supplementary
information file.
5.1 Quantified benefits if all revenue were
spent on one programme
Table 3 shows the specific quantified benefits, if all
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Table 2: Poverty reduction programmes, their main quantified benefits and co-benefits.
Programme Main quantified benefit Unit programme for calculations Co-benefits
Electrification Connections of households 260 000 connections Productive use of electricity
to electricity grid per year
Free basic Households receiving 1 000 000 households Fewer health and safety impacts by 
energy (LPG) 5 kg LPG per month replacing paraffin, wood or coal
Sustainable Sustainable houses 250 000 houses Houses that are warmer in winter, cooler 
housing improved by subsidy in summer, have ceilings and hot water
– generally better houses; improved health
due to lower energy use required indoors 
Rooftop solar Households with fully 100 000 households Household energy security / autonomy;  
home system subsidised PV systems improved health due to lower energy
use required indoors
Figure 6: Expenditure required for four energy poverty reduction programmes.
carbon revenue in the four scenarios (WEM-Hi,
WAM-Lo, WEM-Med and WAM-Med) were spent
on a single programme. The benefits were quanti-
fied in its physical units specific to each programme:
connections of households to the grid, households
receiving subsidised LPG, sustainable houses built
and rooftop solar systems. Benefits on the scale of
hundreds of thousands to several millions (in each
unit) could be funded annually by carbon revenue.
Values in Table 3 have been rounded to the nearest
hundred thousand. 
The largest quantified benefit is 33.2 million
households receiving free basic energy in 2030
under the WEM-Hi scenario. This number is rough-
ly double the total number of households in South
Africa, 16.7 million in 2016 [93]. The results should
be understood as the quantified benefits of energy
poverty reduction that could be funded by carbon
revenue, if no other constraints were present.
Another way of considering the result is that a sce-
nario with high emissions and tax rate would gener-
ate tax revenue in which twice as much free LPG
could be funded in 2030 (pace institutional and
other constraints). When assuming more mitigation
and therefore fewer emissions taxed and a medium
tax rate, still 12.5 million households’ free LPG
could be funded. 
The WEM-Lo scenario can fund 200 000 con-
nections to the electricity grid per year. Given little
mitigation and a tax rate of ZAR 6, connections stay
constant over time in rounded numbers. The WAM-
Hi has the maximum number of connections,
reaching 2.5 million in 2050. From Section 4.1, the
study seeks to bring forward an understanding that
this exceeds the historical capacity to rollout electri-
fication by two orders of magnitude. This study
makes no suggestion that this rate is feasible, given
institutional and operational constraints, but the
findings are the benefits that can be funded from
carbon tax revenues.
The results in Table 3 further show that the
incremental costs for between 30 000 and 6.7 mil-
lion improved houses could be funded per year,
which is a wide range, depending on four carbon
tax revenue scenarios. These are the costs of
improvements, in addition to housing subsidies, as
mentioned in Section 4.3. There is ample carbon
revenue generated to fund building more efficient
and sustainable houses for poor households.
Under different carbon revenue tax scenarios,
an average of 600 000 households could receive
fully subsidised rooftop solar with the full range
from 100 000 to 1.4 million households. These are
1.5 kWp systems for poor households, as described
in Section 4.4. Not considered in this study, given
its focus on poverty reduction, is a 50% subsidy,
with the other half paid by middle-class households,
which could be applied in other income groups dif-
ferentially.
5.2 Reducing energy poverty by combined
programmes 
An integrated strategy combining a set of pro-
grammes is more likely to reduce energy poverty
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Table 3: Quantified benefits of four programmes, for four carbon revenues scenarios and selected
years (Scenario names as defined in Table 1).
2016 2020 2025 2030
Electrification Connections of households to electricity grid
WEM-Hi 1 800 000 1 900 000 2 100 000 2 500 000 
WAM-Lo 200 000 200 000 200 000 200 000 
WEM-Med 1 100 000 1 200 000 1 300 000 1 600 000 
WAM-Med 1 000 000 1 000 000 1 000 000 900 000 
Free basic energy Households receiving 5 kg LPG per month 
WEM-Hi 21 700 000 25 600 000 28 300 000 33 200 000 
WAM-Lo 2 500 000 2 700 000 2 600 000 2 500 000 
WEM-Med 13 500 000 16 000 000 17 700 000 20 700 000 
WAM-Med 12 300 000 13 600 000 13 100 000 12 500 000 
Sustainable housing Houses built
WEM-Hi 200 000 500 000 1 800 000 6 700 000 
WAM-Lo 30 000 100 000 200 000 500 000 
WEM-Med 200 000 300 000 1 100 000 4 200 000 
WAM-Med 100 000 300 000 800 000 2 500 000 
Rooftop solar Households with fully subsidised photovoltaic systems
WEM-Hi 900 000 1 100 000 1 200 000 1 400 000 
WAM-Lo 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 
WEM-Med 600 000 700 000 700 000 900 000 
WAM-Med 500 000 600 000 600 000 500 000 
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than investing all revenues in one option. Table 4
presents the carbon revenues from four scenarios
applied to the combination of all four programmes. 
Considering the plain cells in Table 4, there is
sufficient funding for the combined four energy
poverty programmes in three of the four scenarios:
by 2019 in WEM-Hi, three years later in WEM-Med
(assuming a medium tax rate) and after a further
two years (i.e. by 2024) in WAM-Med (more mitiga-
tion is assumed and hence fewer emissions taxed). 
The differences in the results in Table 4 are driv-
en primarily by the respective tax rate, with more
integrated poverty reduction being funded at the
high tax rate of ZAR 48, compared to the low rate
of ZAR 6 as expressed Section 3.2. Comparing the
two scenarios with medium tax rates, more poverty
can be funded if only existing measures were taken
(WEM-Med), whereas the WAM-Med scenario
spends more on mitigation. There is, however, a
clear trend over time, and more poverty reduction
could be funded over time. 
Over time, Table 4 shows that carbon revenues
applied at the range of tax rates in draft legislation
and to all emissions can fund an integrated strategy,
combining four energy poverty reduction pro-
grammes. By 2030, even the lowest carbon rev-
enue scenario (WAM-Lo) funds about 70% of the
combined cost of electrification, free LPG,
improved sustainable housing and subsidised
rooftop solar. In the other three scenarios, depend-
ing on tax rate and emissions projections, Table 4
indicates that full-funding-equivalence is reached by
2019, 2022 or 2024. It is reasonable, on this basis,
to deduce that carbon revenue can fund combined
energy poverty reduction in the near-to-medium
term in South Africa. 
6. Limitations, possible extensions and
future work 
Turning to limitations of this study, one is that the
spatial scale here was national and limited to one
country. Future analysis of carbon pricing and
reducing poverty, particularly in other developing
countries, might provide comparison, learning from
what is similar as well as differences. 
The study noted that no single programme is
likely to eradicate energy poverty on its own.
Further programmes could be added to the four
considered here. The consideration of integrated or
combined programmes should also, as noted, pay
attention to the institutional and operational dimen-
sions of rolling out poverty reduction programmes.
Case studies drawing on experience of the expand-
ed public works programmes, indigent policies and
programmes in cities and rural areas, as well as
other existing programmes, would be a useful com-
plement to the present analysis. 
Methodologically, the analysis is based on a sim-
ple spreadsheet model, which is provided as sup-
plementary information. This has the advantage of
transparency, and is useful for an initial proof of
concept. However, the interactions between differ-
ent energy poverty programmes and the energy-
economic analysis, could be explored in an energy
system model [94] or linked energy-economic mod-
els [95]. The latter would be useful in providing fur-
Table 4: Number of combined energy poverty programmes that could be funded in different carbon
revenue scenarios (Scenario names as defined in Table 1). 
WEM-Hi WAM-Lo WEM-Med WAM-Med
2016 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.4 
2017 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.4 
2018 0.9 0.2 0.6 0.5 
2019 1.1 0.2 0.7 0.6 
2020 1.3 0.3 0.8 0.7 
2021 1.4 0.3 0.9 0.7 
2022 1.6 0.3 1.0 0.8 
2023 1.9 0.4 1.2 0.9 
2024 2.1 0.4 1.3 1.0 
2025 2.4 0.4 1.5 1.1 
2026 2.7 0.5 1.7 1.2 
2027 3.1 0.5 1.9 1.3 
2028 3.5 0.6 2.2 1.4 
2029 3.9 0.6 2.5 1.5 
2030 4.4 0.7 2.7 1.7 
Note: Shaded cells indicate that there is insufficient revenue to fund all four programmes in that year and bold cells
the years in which more than twice the carbon revenues are available for the combined programmes, while plain cells
indicate that there is still more than sufficient funding to implement four energy poverty programmes outlined in this
study.
ther information on the job-creation potential and
other socio-economic benefits, not only directly in
the energy sector but also accounting for linkages to
the rest of the economy. 
The research question and analysis in this study
might be considered to have internal contradictions.
Some of the poverty programmes analysed here
could be considered to increase emissions, which is
at odds with the principles of a carbon tax. The
options of electrification and free LPG entail GHG
emissions. While this is considered in sections 4.1
and 4.2 respectively, the analysis could have limited
the energy interventions to low-emissions option.
However, such an approach limits poverty reduc-
tion options, in a manner that runs the risk of con-
veying that that ‘the rich get richer and the poor get
renewables’ [96]. This study treated poverty and
mitigation as independent factors; further work that
might relate the two would be complementary. 
This study did not analyse carbon taxes as
Pigouvian taxes, which internalise the costs of neg-
ative externalities. The author considers the devel-
opment of tax rates that are equal to the social cost
of the externality to be beyond the scope of a single
study that also develops the revenue scenarios, pro-
grammes and compares revenues and expendi-
tures. A study on carbon taxes that reflect the full
cost of externalities deserves a paper of its own.
Here, the scope was limited and a simpler starting
point to focus on answering its research question
was adopted. 
Treasury assumptions were followed, notably
applying carbon tax to all emissions in the invento-
ry[51], but reducing the tax rate as in draft legisla-
tion [50] as discussed in Section 3. Once company
or facility-level carbon budgets are enforced, it
might be of interest to analyse the revenues gener-
ated by taxing only those emissions above the
allowable carbon budget. On first principles, apply-
ing the same rates to a smaller amount of emissions
would yield less revenue. On the other hand, the
effective tax rates are very low (ZAR 6–48, roughly
USD 0.5–4, per ton CO2–eq) and higher carbon
prices would be necessary globally to achieve the
temperature goals of the Paris Agreement [4].
Future work might consider higher tax rates, applied
to emissions above an allowable threshold. 
Future work might examine emission projections
that result from assumed tax rates, treating them as
dependent variables. System models as mentioned
above might consider how dependent variables
could be modelled, while paying attention to the
use and misuse of models [97]. 
Another limitation is that the paper examines
the scale of revenue and equivalent expenditure,
and does not propose or examine the budgetary
process required to allocate expenditure. It was
noted at the outset that no proposal for ring-fencing
of revenues is made; this provides another reason
to treat mitigation and poverty as independent vari-
ables. Further work might examine budget-alloca-
tion processes and how these balance policy objec-
tives and principles of good public finance manage-
ment. 
If such future work were undertaken, it might
also move from the aggregate national scale to con-
sider the implications at local (company) level.
Future studies could examine carbon revenues that
might be payable by Eskom, Sasol, members of the
energy intensive users group, and other major emit-
ters in South Africa, and whether there are means
for them to spend directly on reducing energy
poverty or if this might be done more efficiently via
the fiscus. Such work might also disaggregate emis-
sions by scope or definitions in Schedule 2 of the
Carbon Tax Bill. 
The analysis supports findings related to funding
from carbon tax revenues only. Institutional capaci-
ty or operational constraints would have to be
addressed in further work. It is with this in mind that
the paper turns to its conclusions.
7. Conclusions 
This study explored the question posed at the out-
set: How much can poverty be reduced through
carbon tax revenue? Scenarios of carbon revenues,
at different tax rates and emission projections were
developed in a spreadsheet model. Four energy
poverty reduction programmes were examined:
electrification, free LPG, improved sustainable
housing and subsidised rooftop solar (see the sup-
plementary information). 
The overall finding of this study was that energy
poverty could be reduced by expenditure of carbon
tax revenues. This finding was supported by results
that applied the equivalence of carbon tax revenue
to individual programmes and an integrated strate-
gy. 
If the equivalent of all carbon revenue in a sce-
nario were applied to a single programme, then sig-
nificant number of connections, subsidies, systems
and improved houses could be funded. If compa-
nies were to pay a medium tax rate of ZAR 30 per
ton, revenues would more than cover the national
budget of electrification, from one ‘unit programme’
on the scale of INEP to even larger programme
funding, with the ancillary benefits of productive
use of electricity. Several million households could
receive free energy in the form of 5 kg of LPG every
month, more than the current number of house-
holds. Results should be understood as deriving
from stated assumptions. Carbon revenue could
fund better housing, by adding to the existing hous-
ing subsidy to fund passive solar design, energy-effi-
cient insulation and solar water-heaters. Even the
lowest carbon revenue scenario considered here
would fund 30 000 improved houses initially, and
more than the build rates observed historically by
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2030. For householders, the benefits may be expe-
rienced as houses that are warmer in winter and
cooler in summer, with ceilings and hot water.
Subsidies for at least 100 000 rooftop solar systems
per year are equivalent to even the lowest carbon
revenue scenario; six times the assumed ‘unit pro-
gramme’ or 600 000 households is the average
result. One co-benefit of rooftop solar is greater
autonomy. Other significant health and safety co-
benefits are expected by reducing air pollution from
burning of fuels indoors for sustainable housing and
rooftop solar. Even LPG can displace paraffin and
wood- or coal-stoves. 
The analysis showed that three of the four car-
bon revenue scenarios provided the equivalent of
funding for an integrated programme, combining all
four programmes; the lowest revenue scenario
funds about 70%. In the three scenarios, the com-
bined four energy poverty reduction programmes
reached full equivalence by 2019, 2022 or 2025
respectively. Based on these findings, it is conclud-
ed that, in the near-to-medium term, carbon rev-
enue could provide equivalent funds for an inte-
grated programme combining four large-scale ener-
gy poverty reduction interventions in South Africa.
Note
1. Supplementary data associated with this article can
be found at http://journals.assaf.org.za/jesa/rt/
suppFiles/2332/0.
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